We explore the network topology arising from a dataset of the overnight interbank transactions on the e-MID trading platform from January 1999 to December 2010. In order to shed light on the hierarchical structure of the banking system, we estimate dierent versions of a core-periphery model. Our main ndings are: (1) A core-periphery structure provides a better t for these interbank data than alternative network models, (2) the identied core is quite stable over time, consisting of roughly 28% of all banks before the global nancial crisis and 23% afterwards, (3) the majority of core banks can be classied as intermediaries, i.e. as banks both borrowing and lending money, (4) allowing for asymmetric`coreness' with respect to lending and borrowing considerably improves the t, and reveals more concentration in borrowing than lending activity of money center banks. During the nancial crisis of 2008, the reduction of interbank lending was mainly due to core banks' reducing their numbers of active outgoing links.
Introduction and Existing Literature
Interbank markets allow banks to exchange central bank money in order to share liquidity risks.
1 At the macro level, however, a high number of bank connections could give rise to systemic risk.
2 Since it is well known that the structure of a network is important for its resilience, 3 policymakers need information on the actual topology of the interbank network.
The experiences of the last few years have made policymakers aware of the necessity of gathering information on the structure of the nancial network in general and the interbank market in particular.
4 One reason for the previous scarcity of research on the connections between nancial institutions is certainly the limitation of available data, 5 the other reason being the neglect of the internal structure of the nancial system by the dominating paradigm in macroeconomics during the last quarter of a century. 6 transaction volumes appear to follow scale-free distributions as well, (4) clustering coecients are usually quite small, (5) interbank networks are close to`small world' structures, and (6) the networks show disassortative mixing, i.e. high-degree nodes tend to trade with low-degree nodes, and vice versa.
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This indicates that small banks tend to trade with large banks, but rarely among themselves. Thus, we might expect the interbank network to display some sort of hierarchical community structure.
In passing, many authors have indeed remarked that there seemed to be some kind of community structure in the interbank network they analyzed.
For example, Boss et al. (2004) note that the Austrian interbank network shows a hierarchical community structure that mirrors the regional and sectoral organization of the Austrian banking system. Soramäki et al. (2006) show that the network includes a tightly connected core of money-center banks to which all other banks connect. Thus there is some form of tiering in the interbank market. The empirical ndings of Cocco et al. (2009) also show that relationships between banks are important factors to explain dierences in interest rates.
Identifying communities in networks is an important aspect and in this paper we are concerned with the identication of the set of arguably systemically important (core) banks. In order to do so, we estimate various versions of core-periphery models in the spirit of Borgatti and Everett (2000) .
10 Similar to De Masi et al. (2006) and Iori et al. (2008) we use data from the Italian e-MID trading platform, which is a market for unsecured deposits virtually covering the entire domestic overnight deposit market in Italy. Coreperiphery models have been applied in a number of interesting elds before, for example to identify the spreaders of sexually transmitted diseases (see Christley et al. (2005) ), in protein interaction networks (see Luo et al. (2009) ), and to identify opinion leaders in economic survey data (see Stolzenburg and Lux (2011) ). To our knowledge, Craig and von Peter (2010) is the rst and so far only contribution applying a core-periphery structure to an interbank market. Applying this core-periphery framework to a data set of credit relationships between German banks, 11 their results speak in favor of outgoing links per bank. 9 Quite interestingly, the conventional explanation of the scale-free degree distribution is that of preferential attachment. Note that this is rather the opposite of disassortative mixing. 10 Another interesting approach in using network-based measures for nancial regulation is presented in Markose et al. (2010) . The authors construct a so-called super-spreader tax based on eigenvector centrality. 11 The authors use comprehensive statistics from the so-called`Gross-und Millionenkreditstatistik' (statistics on large loans and concentrated exposures) from the Deutsche Bundesbank. In Germany, nancial institutions have to report (on a quarterly basis) their a very stable set of core banks. Furthermore, they show that core membership can be predicted using bank-specic features such as balance sheet size.
12 In this paper we will apply the (unrestricted) discrete core-periphery model, the (restricted) tiering model due to Craig and von Peter (2010) as well as symmetric and asymmetric versions of a continuous core-periphery model (hitherto not applied to interbank data) to a dierent set of interbank market data. Using a detailed dataset containing all overnight interbank transactions in the Italian interbank market from January 1999 to December 2010, we nd that a core-periphery structure provides a better t for these interbank data than alternative network models. The identied core shows a high degree of persistence over time, consisting of roughly 28% of all banks before the global nancial crisis and 23% afterwards. We can classify the majority of core banks as intermediaries, i.e. as banks both borrowing and lending money in the market. Furthermore, allowing for asymmetric`coreness' with respect to lending and borrowing activity considerably improves the t, and reveals more concentration in borrowing than lending activity of money center banks. We also shed light on the development during the nancial crisis of 2008, nding that the reduction of interbank lending was mainly due to core banks' reducing their numbers of active outgoing links.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 gives a brief introduction into necessary terminology for the formalisation of (interbank) networks, section 3 introduces the Italian e-MID interbank data and highlights some of its important properties. Section 4 introduces different variants of the core-periphery model. Section 5 presents the results and dierent robustness checks. Section 6 discusses the ndings and section 7 concludes. A set of appendices provides more technical details as well as further robustness checks.
Networks
A network consists of a set of N nodes that are connected by M edges (links). Taking each bank as a node and the interbank positions between them as links, the interbank network can be represented as a square matrix of dimension N × N (data matrix, denoted D).
13 An element d ij of this total exposure to each counterparty to whom they have extended credit of at least 1.5 million Euros or 10% of their liable capital to the Bundesbank. These reports include outstanding claims of any maturity. 12 We cannot carry out such an analysis since we do not observe bank IDs, see below. 13 In the following, matrices will be written in bold, capital letters. Vectors and scalars will be written as lower-case letters. matrix represents a gross interbank claim, the total value of credit extended by bank i to bank j within a certain period. The size of d ij can thus be seen as a measure of link intensity. Row (column) i shows bank i's interbank claims (liabilities) towards all other banks. The diagonal elements d ii are zero, since a bank will not trade with itself.
14 O-diagonal elements are positive in the presence of a link and zero otherwise.
Interbank data usually give rise to directed, sparse and valued networks.
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However, much of the extant network research ignores the last aspect by focusing on binary adjacency matrices only. An adjacency matrix A contains elements a ij equal to 1, if there is a directed link from bank i to j and 0 otherwise. Since the network is directed, both A and D are asymmetric in general. In this paper, we also take into account valued information by using both the raw data matrix as well as a matrix containing the number of trades between banks, denoted as T. In some cases it is also useful to work with the undirected version of the adjacency matrices, A u , where a u ij = max(a ij , a ji ).
As usual, some data aggregation is necessary to represent the system as a network. In the following, we use quarterly networks. The next section summarizes the most important properties of our data, more detailed information can be found in Finger et al. (2012) .
Dataset
The Italian electronic market for interbank deposits (e-MID) is a screenbased platform for trading of unsecured money-market deposits in Euros, USDollars, Pound Sterling, and Zloty operating in Milan through e-MID SpA.
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The market is fully centralized and very liquid; in 2006 e-MID accounted for 17% of total turnover in the unsecured money market in the Euro area. The trading mechanism follows a quote-driven market and is similar to a limit-order-book in a stock market, but without consolidation. The market is transparent in the sense that the quoting banks' IDs are visible to all other banks. Quotes contain the market side (buy or sell money), the volume, the interest rate and the maturity. Trades are registered when a bank (aggressor)
actively chooses a quoted order. The platform allows for credit line checking before a transaction will be carried out, so trades have to be conrmed by both counterparties. The market also allows direct bilateral trades between counterparties.
The minimum quote size is 1.5 million Euros, whereas the minimum trade size is only 50,000 Euros. Thus, aggressors do not have to trade the entire amount quoted.
18 Additional participant requirements, for example a certain amount of total assets, may pose an upward bias on the size of the participating banks. In any case, e-MID covers essentially the entire domestic overnight deposit market in Italy.
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We have access to all registered trades in Euro in the period from January 1999 to December 2010. For each trade we know the two banks' ID numbers (not the names), their relative position (aggressor and quoter), the maturity and the transaction type (buy or sell). As mentioned above, the majority of trades is conducted overnight and due to the global nancial crisis (GFC) markets for longer maturities essentially dried up. We will focus on all overnight trades conducted on the platform, leaving a total number of 1,317,679 trades. The large sample size of 12 years allows us to analyze the network evolution over time. Here we focus on the quarterly aggregates, leaving us with 48 snapshots of the network.
17 This development is driven by the fact that the market is unsecured. The recent nancial crisis made unsecured loans in general less attractive, with stronger impact for longer maturities. See below. It should be noted, that there is also a market for secured loans called e-MIDER. 18 The minimum quote size could pose an upward bias for participating banks. It would be interesting to check who are the quoting banks and who are the aggressors. Furthermore it would be interesting to look at quote data, as we only have access to actual trades. 19 More details can be found on the e-MID website, see http://www.e-mid.it/.
The left panel of Figure The data show a trivial community structure in that foreign banks tend to trade with each other preferentially, and so do Italian banks. Due to the limited extent of trading between both components, and the smaller number of foreign banks, we will focus on Italian banks only in our subsequent
analysis. This leaves a total number of 1,215,759 trades for the analysis. 
All Italian Foreign
Figure 1: Number of active banks (left) and traded volume (right) over time. We also split the traded volume into money lent by Italian and foreign banks, respectively.
Other important ndings are:
• The e-MID network has a relatively high density compared to other interbank networks investigated in the literature.
20 See Figures 1 and   20 Note that the density in the German interbank network is smaller for two reasons: rst, the number of active banks is much larger, so it is more likely to observe missing links. Second, in our analysis we focus on overnight trades only, while Craig and von Peter (2010) use aggregate credit volumes of all maturities (probably only with a small fraction of overnight trades). It seems plausible that the probability of observing a link between any two banks should be inversely related to the maturity of the loan. 
with M t being the number of observed links and N t the number of active banks in the respective quarter. A Chow-test indicates that there is a structural break after quarter 39 at all sensible signicance levels for the Italian banks. A CUSUM-test also indicates a structural break, however, the time series seems to revert towards its pre-GFC level.
2. For the density of the network formed by Italian banks, a Chow-test and a CUSUM-test both indicate that there is a structural break after quarter 39 (i.e. at the onset of the nancial crisis). Later on, we will see that the core-periphery structure was also inuenced by the GFC.
• The aggregation period is important for economic applications as the network structure is less volatile with longer aggregation periods. Since the network is sparse, short periods will only give an incomplete image of existing linkages, where many links between otherwise frequent trading partners may be dormant. In order to obtain a more comprehensive and less random picture of existing links, a larger aggregation period is required. We will, therefore, use quarterly data in the following (but results are robust to somewhat shorter or larger aggregation periods).
• There is very small (at times even negative) correlation between the banks' in-and out-degrees. Hence, the directed version of the network might contain important additional information.
• The underlying distributions of in-and out-degrees are apparently not scale-free at any aggregation level (including the daily level), cf. Finger et al. (2012) . The same holds for transaction volumes.
• The network shows disassortative mixing patterns, so nodes with high overall degree (number of connections) tend to connect with low-degree nodes. We nd similar assortativity coecients for the relation between in-and out-degree, so high in-degree (out-degree) nodes tend to connect to low out-degree (in-degree) nodes.
In the next section, we will describe the dierent versions of the coreperiphery model in detail.
Models
Core-periphery network models have been proposed rst by Borgatti and Everett (2000) . The basic idea is that a network can be divided into subgroups of core and periphery members. The discrete model partitions banks such that core (periphery) banks are maximally (minimally) connected to each other. The concept of discrete group membership can be extended by considering the core and periphery as opposite ends of a continuum. The continuous model overcomes the excessive simplicity of the discrete partitioning, by assigning a`coreness' level to each bank. In the following we will rst present the discrete model, with the tiering model proposed by Craig and von Peter (2010) as a special case, and then move on to the asymmetric continuous model for directed networks due to Boyd et al. (2010) . Throughout the following we assume that a network cannot have more than one core. 
The idealized pattern matrix (P I ) for a`pure' coreperiphery segmentation, then, looks as follows:
where 1 and 0 denote submatrices of ones and zeros. 21 Everett and Borgatti (2000) include the possibility of multiple cores. 22 The diagonal elements will be ignored in all that follows, since the network is not self-referential.
The CC-block contains the top-tier banks, while the PP-block contains the periphery. Note that the o-diagonal blocks may be 1-blocks (each core member connected to all periphery-nodes), 0-blocks (no connection between core and periphery members) or something in between, depending on the problem. Borgatti and Everett (2000) claim that only the diagonal blocks are characteristic of CP structures and are thus the dening property. We will denote this version, without any restrictions on the o-diagonal blocks, as the discrete model.
In some cases however, the underlying model explicitly dictates requirements on the CP and PC blocks. For instance, Craig and von Peter (2010) propose a more strictly tiered interbank market than the benchmark discrete structure. In this model, a key characteristic of core banks (top tier) is that they intermediate between periphery banks. If at least a minimum level of intermediation activity is required of a`core' bank, this means that CP and PC have to be row-and column-regular, 23 respectively, i.e. at least one entry has to be non-zero in each row of CP and in each column of PC.
Optimization Problem
The discrete core-periphery framework amounts to assigning to each bank the property of membership in the core or the periphery. This classication can be summarized in a vector c of zeros and ones of length N (the total number of banks). The usual approach to nd the optimal coreness vector, c, referred to as the minimum residual (MINRES) approach, is to t a pattern matrix P = cc , which should be as close as possible to the observed network matrix A. This requires to identify the core banks, which are unknown a priori.
We start by dening a coreness vector, ordering the core banks rst and writing the set of core members as C = {1, · · · , N c }.
24 Then we can measure the`t' of the corresponding core-periphery structure as the total number of inconsistencies between the observed network and the idealized pattern matrix P I of the same dimension. Depending on the problem, the distance involves certain restrictions on the o-diagonal blocks, CP and PC. The optimal partition C * thus minimizes the residuals and gives the optimal set of core banks.
Residuals are obtained by simply counting the errors in each of the four blocks of Eq. (1) and aggregating over the blocks. The core-core block should 23 See Doreian et al. (2005) . 24 Note that in order to have a core, N c has to be ≥ 2. Also note the dierence between C and c: C is the set of core banks and thus is a vector of dimension N c , while c is a vector of zeros and ones. Of course, both C and c carry the same information. For the general version of the discrete model with arbitrary o-diagonal blocks, the aggregate errors in the individual blocks can be written as
The total error score (e) then simply aggregates the errors across the relevant blocks, normalized by the total number of links in the network.
26 Formally this can be written as
with e(·) being a function of C since every possible partition is associated with a particular value of e. For the tiering model proposed by Craig and von Peter (2010) , the aggregate errors in the o-diagonal blocks can be calculated as
and
respectively, leading to additional non-zero entries in e(C).
The optimal partition C * is the set of core banks producing the smallest distance to an idealized pattern matrix of the same dimension, i.e.
where Ω denotes all strict and non-empty subsets of the population {1, · · · , N }.
It should be noted, however, that the discrete approach implicitly assumes 25 The maximum number of possible inconsistencies in this block would be N c (N c − 1) since the main diagonal is ignored. This upper bound is obviously never reached since otherwise there would be no core-periphery structure. 26 Note that M is the maximum error possible in a network consisting only of a periphery.
symmetry of the underlying structure (or irrelevance of the direction of links).
Therefore, in Section 4.2 we will turn to a continuous core-periphery model, which explicitly takes the directed nature of the network into account, characterizing coreness by two vectors rather than one.
Implementation
Fitting the discrete and the tiering model to a real-world network is a large A number of algorithms have been applied to tackle such problems. We will use a Genetic Algorithm (GA) to t both the discrete and the tiering model.
27
A GA uses operations similar to genetic processes of biological organisms to develop better solutions of an optimization problem from an existing population of (randomly initiated) candidate solutions. Typically the proposed solutions are encoded in strings (chromosomes) mostly using a binary alphabet, i.e. in our setting the strings have length N and consist of ones and zeros, depending on whether a bank is in the core or periphery. We use the rate of correct classications (in terms of the error score) by a string l, f l = 1 − e(C l ) as a tness function that drives the evolutionary search.
Details are explained in Appendix A.1.
The Continuous Model 4.2.1 Basic Structure
One limitation of the partition-based approach presented above is the excessive simplicity of dening just two homogeneous classes of nodes: core and periphery. Assuming that the network data consist of continuous values representing strengths or capacities of relationships (for banking data:
27 We cross-checked the results using the sequential algorithm applied in Craig and von Peter (2010) . Alternatives would be the Kerninghan-Lin Algorithm (Kernighan and Lin (1970) ), see Boyd et al. (2006) for an application, and Branch-and-Bound Programming, see Brusco (2011) . credit volumes or number of transactions), it seems sensible to also consider a continuous model in which each node is assigned a measure of`coreness'.
Since a continuous measure of coreness allows for more exibility in capturing the role of an institution, we apply this model to the valued matrix D of interbank liabilities rather than the binary adjacency matrix A.
The usual approach in the symmetric continuous (SC) model is to nd a coreness vector c, where 1 ≥ c i ≥ 0 ∀i, with pattern matrix P = cc that approximates the observed data matrix as closely as possible. Similar to the presentation of the discrete model, the optimal coreness vector in the symmetric continuous (SC) model can be found using the MINRES approach.
28 Again however, this method imposes a symmetric pattern matrix, i.e. p ij = p ji ∀i, j. Thus, it is assumed that the strength of the relation from i to j is the same as that from j to i. To overcome this restriction, we also estimate an asymmetric continuous (AC) core-periphery model, as introduced by Boyd et al. (2010) . This formulation involves two vectors, representing the degrees of outgoing and incoming centrality for each node. For networks of international trade, for example, the two vectors would correspond to exports and imports, respectively. In our setting, the two vectors correspond to out-and in-coreness. Note that both the SC and AC model can be applied to valued matrices, with binary adjacency matrices being just a special case.
Thus the continuous models might allow us to extract important additional information from the directed, valued networks. However, a disadvantage of the continuous models is that restrictions, such as the tiering model, cannot be implemented. In the following, we will briey introduce both model versions. More details on the AC model can be found in Appendix A.3.
The Symmetric Continuous (SC) Model
The SC model will again be estimated by minimization of residuals. MIN-RES seeks a column vector c such that the square matrix D is approximated by the pattern matrix P = cc . Ignoring the diagonal elements, this amounts to minimizing the sum of squared dierences of the o-diagonal elements, or arg min
In the same spirit as with our optimization algorithm in the discrete case, we use the proportional reduction of error (PRE) as our measure of t. PRE 28 An interesting alternative approach, based on the Kullback-Leiber distance, can be found in Muñiz and Carvajal (2006) and Muñiz et al. (2011) . 
The Asymmetric Continuous (AC) Model
The idea of the asymmetric continuous (AC) model is to decompose overall`coreness' into`out-coreness' and`in-coreness' (denoted by u i and v i in the following), respectively. Applying this distinction allows us to write the objective function for the AC model as arg min
The optimal coreness vectors can be determined by nding the roots of the rst-order conditions of Eq. (9).
29 The PRE of the AC model can be dened similarly as in Eq. (8) as
For both the SC and the AC models, we will, in order to adjust for the skewness of the network matrices, log-transform the data matrix in the form log(1 + D), where the factor 1 makes sure that zeros in the original matrix remain zeros in the transformed matrix.
30 Note that the split into in-and out-coreness is germane to a singular value decomposition of our matrix D of interbank liabilities. This similarity is exploited in the empirical estimation of the vectors u and v. Our numerical approach for estimating these two coreness vectors follows Boyd et al. (2010) and is detailed in Appendix A.3.
29 This could be implemented by using standard algorithms for numerical optimization. Here we used a trust-region algorithm. 30 We also tried to t the core-periphery models to the raw network matrices, however, the high level of skewness in the data results in a very poor t in general. These results are hardly comparable to those presented below, see Appendix A.9.
Results
This section presents and discusses the results from the dierent versions of the core-periphery framework. In the following, as noted above, we focus on the quarterly networks formed by Italian banks only. Robustness checks, using dierent aggregation periods and sample banks can be found in the Appendix. 31 Recall that the discrete and tiering model use the (binary) adjacency matrices A, while the continuous model uses the valued matrix of transaction volumes D, as dened in section 2.
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As a rst step, we compare the coreness vectors between the dierent models. It will become clear that the discrete and tiering model are almost identical throughout. Later on, we show that the AC model contains important information from the asymmetric nature of the network, since the inand out-coreness vectors are far from being perfectly correlated. Secondly, we investigate the properties of the core/periphery banks. We nd that the core is large compared to the ndings in Craig and von Peter (2010) , but also very persistent over time. Due to the high network density, we nd that the error scores are also much higher compared to the German market. In particular, the model t deteriorates over time due to the GFC. Formal tests suggest a signicant worsening of the t of the core-periphery model after the GFC, pointing towards the breakdown some part of the core-periphery structure.
As a last step, we investigate the signicance of the results by comparing the identied cores and the corresponding error scores to the cores obtained from random and scale-free networks, calibrated to share similar properties as the observed ones along certain dimensions. Here we nd that the identied cores are signicant, i.e. the identied core-periphery structure is not a spurious network property. Obviously the correlation between the cores in the discrete and tiering model 31 Appendix A.6 discusses the ndings for other aggregation periods, most importantly for monthly and yearly networks. Appendix A.7 discusses the results when including foreign banks to the analysis.
Model Similarity
32 Appendix A.8 discusses the results for the continuous model using the matrix containing the number of transactions T. Appendix A.9 discusses further robustness checks.
is very high with a value of around .95.
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The same is true for the discrete core and the out-coreness with a value of .73, whereas the correlation between the discrete core and the in-coreness is much smaller with a value of .26.
34 Core banks from the discrete model are therefore more likely to be in the out-core of the continuous model as well, but not necessarily in the in-core. This result seems rather surprising at rst, since for example the results from Cocco et al. (2009) suggest that small (periphery) banks are net lenders, which oer their excess liquidity to a preferred set of large (core) banks. Our analysis shows that at least in the present data set, the pattern of interbank linkages is more complex: again, periphery banks lend money to a relatively small set of selected core banks, but the core banks in turn tend to redistribute this liquidity not only among the other core banks, but also among a larger part of the periphery. Technically, we nd that the density in the CP-block is on average three times higher than the density in the PC-block (see Figure 6 below), so for most core banks the out-degree clearly exceeds the in-degree.
35 Therefore, it is not surprising that the correlation between the discrete and the out-coreness is higher than the correlation with the in-coreness. This shows that there is a considerable amount of asymmetry in the network, also captured by the negative correlation of -.08 between the in-and out-coreness vectors, cf. Figure 3 . We see that these relations are rather stable. Interestingly, the correlation between in-and out-coreness was always the smallest of these combinations, turning negative after 12 quarters and remaining so for the rest of the sample period. This hints towards the existence of dierent subgroups in the core.
In the following we present more detailed results for the discrete and tiering model, then moving on to the continuous model. 33 Therefore, the correlations between the tiering core and the in-/out-coreness are not presented here since they are very similar to those from the general discrete model. 34 Interestingly, we see that the correlation between the coreness vectors from the (symmetric) discrete and the SC model is only .7578. One might expect that this is partly driven by the fact that the input matrix is valued, rather than binary in the continuous case. Estimating the continuous model with binary network matrices, however, yields very similar results, see Appendix A.9, with a correlation of .7635. Thus, the main reason for the low correlation between the two vectors lies in the objective function: the continuous models approximate the complete matrix, while the discrete model focuses on the diagonal blocks. 35 This also explains the small (at times even negative) correlation between individual banks' in-and out-degree. there is a structural break for the detrended time series after quarter 10, while there is no evidence for a signicant structural break after quarter 39. An additional CUSUM test indicates that this break is signicant at all sensible condence levels. We also note a signicant level of autocorrelation in the detrended time series, while the rst dierence of the original time series is stationary.
Discrete and Tiering Model

The Size of the Core and Periphery
We saw that the identied cores in the discrete and tiering model are highly correlated. In fact, Figure 4 shows that the sizes of their cores are very similar over time. Note that the core in the discrete model is always at least as large as the core in the tiering model. The reason lies in the requirement that all core banks in the tiering model act as intermediaries, which is not necessarily true for the discrete model, even though again the vast majority of core banks acts as intermediaries in this case. Overall, the dierences between the two model versions consist of a few borderline cases.
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Note also the negative trend in the absolute size of the cores over time.
This is not surprising given that the number of active Italian banks has been decreasing over time. Interestingly, a Chow-test indicates the existence of a structural break in the (detrended) core sizes after quarter 10, with the trend going back towards its initial level in the post-GFC period.
37 The 36 In cases where the row-and column-regularity constraints are binding, it may also happen that core banks from the discrete model are part of the periphery in the tiering model. 37 Iori et al. (2007) also mention this structural break in the Italian interbank network in quarter 10, however, without conducting formal tests. They relate this breakpoint to economic signicance of this result is, however, questionable as we see in Figure 4 that a linear negative trend might t the entire sample period quite well, and we know that the sharp drop after quarter 39 was due to the GFC. Given the overall trend in the number of active banks, it seems more interesting to consider the relative size of the core compared to the complete interbank network. Figure 5 shows that the relative size of the core is rather stable over time, uctuating around 28% before the GFC, and around 23% afterwards. A Chow-test indicates that there is a structural break after quarter 39. However, under a CUSUM test this break is only marginally signicant at the 5% level for the discrete model, and insignicant for the tiering model. Thus, there is some evidence that the GFC has led to a structural break in the formerly relatively stable structure of intermediation in the interbank market. However, we also see a positive trend in the core sizes for the last 3 quarters of the sample period, so that the relative core size seemed to revert to its pre-GFC level. Not surprisingly, the size of the core is highly correlated with the density of the network (cf. Figure 2) . We should note that relative core sizes are very high compared to the value of 3% found for the German interbank market by Craig and von Peter (2010) . This is driven by the very high overall network density of above 20%, compared to only 0.61% for the German market.
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The left panel of Figure 6 shows the densities of the complete network and the core-core and periphery-periphery subnetworks over time. Since results are virtually the same for both models, we only display those of the baseline discrete model 39 with rather stable values for the pre-GFC period, but again with a structural break after quarter 39 for all time series in the Figure. The density in the CC-block is at least 2.5 times that of the entire network and at least 6 times that of the PP-block. The right panel of Figure 6 shows the densities in the o-diagonal blocks. As already mentioned, the density in the CP-block is three times higher than the corresponding density in the PCblock. These values are very stable over time, and we do not nd evidence for a structural break. two events: (1) ocial and market interest rates changed their trend from positive to negative, (2) the ECB tried to support economic growth by increasing the amount of liquidity provided. 38 Recall that the number of banks in the German market is roughly 1800, so the network is at least 10 times larger than the Italian network. Thus it is not surprising, that the density is much higher in the Italian case. Since the e-MID sample presumably contains mainly large banks, our core might be the core of the overall banking network. See Figure  21 in Appendix A.2 for a network illustration for one particular quarter. 39 Results from the tiering model are available upon request. We checked that the results from the tiering model are statistically not distinguishable from the results of the discrete model. there is a structural break after quarter 39 at all sensible signicance levels. An additional CUSUM test indicates that this break is marginally signicant at the 5% level. . Individual Chow-tests indicate that there is a structural break in the time-series in the left panel after quarter 39 at all sensible signicance levels (see also Figure 2 ). Additional CUSUM-tests indicate that the structural breaks are signicant at all sensible signicance levels, with the PP-density apparently containing an additional structural break around quarter 10. In contrast, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no structural break in the time-series of the right panel. 
The Structure of the Core and Periphery
To gain more insights into the structure of the network, Figure 7 shows the fraction of intermediaries, lenders and borrowers in the complete network over time. Here we dene borrowers as banks with an out-degree of zero but positive in-degree in a given quarter, whereas the reverse holds for lenders.
The remaining banks, with both positive in-and out-degree, are thus intermediaries. We see that these fractions are relatively stable over time: most of the banks (roughly 75%) act as intermediaries, a smaller fraction acts as lenders (20%) and the remainder consists of sole borrowers. Interestingly, the fraction of sole borrowers seems to increase signicantly after the GFC, since we nd a structural break after quarter 39. This may hint towards the entry of banks who use the market only to attract funds. In contrast, there is no signicant structural break for the fraction of intermediaries and lenders. Table 2 shows the transition probabilities for each strategy, with I t denoting that a bank is an intermediary in t. L, B and E stand for lending, borrowing and exit, respectively. The matrix shows, for example, that with a probability of 88.45% an intermediating bank in t − 1 will also be an intermediary in t. Note that the diagonal elements are largest, even though the borrowing strategy is less persistent over time compared to the other strategies. This is in line with the observation of a more intense entry of sole borrowers during and after the GFC. To elucidate the stability of these structural properties, consider Table 0 Table 3 : Transition matrix: discrete model. C, P and E stand for core, periphery and exit, respectively.
3 containing transition probabilities of the state of a bank for the discrete model. For example, the rst rows show the probabilities of a core bank in t − 1 (C t−1 ) being a core member in t, switching to the periphery (P t ) or exiting the market (E t ). There is some asymmetry in the Table, for example, the probability of switching from the core to the periphery is roughly 15.6%, while the reverse probability is only 5.5%. In particular, the diagonal entries are very high with values above 80%, such that there is signicant persistence (autocorrelation) in the group memberships.
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The above transition probabilities are aggregate values over the entire sample period. To investigate the inherent structural stability, the values in this matrix should be roughly constant over time. Figure 9 shows the time evolution of these values for the discrete model. We see that the elements on the main diagonal are quite stable over time and very large in general.
However P (C|C) becomes smaller due to the GFC simply because a number of core banks become part of the periphery, which can be seen by the increase in P (P |C) to more than 20%. Again we emphasize that we do not observe banks' names, so we are unable to track for example bank mergers and acquisitions.
Besides the overall structural stability, one might also be interested in the stability of the system at the micro-level of bilateral connections. In order to assess the stability of the link structure in the dierent blocks, we use the so-called Jaccard Index. This is dened as
where M xy is the number of relations with status x in period t − 1 and with status y in the next period. It thus measures the similarity between subsequent graphs, taking only links into account which were present in at least one period. Social networks are usually considered to be suciently stable for values of J larger than .3, in which case the network is likely to 40 Note that the structure is very stable despite the existence of a structural break due to the GFC after quarter 39, cf. section 5.5. 42 See Finger et al. (2012) . 43 Given that the coreness vectors are highly autocorrelated, this is not a very restrictive assumption, but it is likely to reduce some noise in the calculated numbers. 44 Cf. Anito (2011) and Braeuning (2011) for related evidence on the robustness of lending relationships over the crisis. network (non-existing links are ignored), these ndings indicate that core banks generally lend towards a large set of core and periphery banks. In contrast, periphery banks are not only reluctant to create links among themselves, but also, given the relatively small density in the PC-block, trade with a small set of core banks, which is not necessarily the same set in each quarter. This nding is interesting, since the persistence in the PC-block should be much larger, if periphery banks would have a preferred partner among the core banks. These ndings may, however, be driven to some extent by the relatively small trading volumes of periphery banks (see below). In any case, the asymmetry between the CP-and PC-blocks is remarkable and will be discussed in more detail below. Coreness is taken from the discrete model. Individual Chowand CUSUM-tests show no evidence of a structural break due to the GFC in any of the time series. However, the CP-and PP-blocks appear to contain a structural break after quarter 10.
Model Fit and Signicance
In this section we turn to a quantitative analysis of the error scores and their signicance. When investigating the signicance of our results, we compare the core sizes and error scores of the empirical networks with those of network structures sharing similar properties along certain dimensions.
This analysis helps us evaluating whether the core-periphery structure oers a meaningful characterization of our data or whether the data rather generate a`spurious' core by chance.
The left panel of Figure 11 shows that the error scores (fractions of residuals) are on average roughly 42%, which is rather high compared to the . These values are, however, way below unity, so the core-periphery model is indeed a better explanation of the data than an unstructured alternative consisting only of a periphery. We also see that the GFC made the t somewhat worse, yielding an error score that is roughly 1.3 times the average score before the GFC, albeit with a declining trend.
A Chow-test and a CUSUM-test again indicate the existence of a structural break after quarter 39 at all sensible signicance levels. The right panel of Figure 11 shows that this structural break is mainly due to the increase in the error score in the PP-block. In contrast, we nd no evidence for a structural break in the error score of the CC-block after quarter 39, but after quarter 10. Given that the relative core size has been signicantly smaller, the overall picture is thus that some previous core banks have reduced their interbank activities so strongly that they are assigned to the periphery after quarter 39. We will investigate the eect of the GFC in more detail in section 5.5.
In order to shed light on the signicance of the observed error scores, we compute the average core size and error scores by generating 100 random samples of particular network structures (see below) and compare the results to our ndings above. The analyzed networks are:
• Erdös-Renyi (ER) random graphs, where a link is formed with probability p. The value of p will be set equal to the observed density of the network. This network is completely random and we do not expect to nd a convincing core-periphery structure in this case. The error scores should be relatively high, since identied cores would be completely spurious. Note that this is tantamount to a bootstrap test for the signicance of our identied core-periphery structures, as the random graphs could also be generated by random resampling of the empirical links (with replacement). If the error scores of the core-periphery model are below a certain percentage boundary of those obtained for the sample of random networks, we could exclude with a signicance level equal to the inverse of that probability, that our results are spuriously obtained from a completely random system of interbank liabilities. As it turns out, all error scores are always way below the minimum obtained for the random networks.
• Scale-free random graphs, with scaling parameter 2.3.
Even though
we found the degree distribution not to be scale-free, see Finger et al.
(2012), most interbank markets appear to have a certain resemblance of their degree distributions to a scale-free distribution. Reported scaling parameters vary between 2 and 3, but are roughly similar for in-and out-degree. We generate these networks using the approach of Goh et al. (2001) . Note that scale-free networks are assortative by denition, since high-degree nodes tend to connect with each other. Therefore we expect the scale-free network to have a much tighter core and signicantly lower error scores.
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In the following we only discuss results from the discrete model to save space.
47 Most of the results were expected: all models show a structural break due to the GFC. The actual error scores lie between those from a completely random network (ER) and those of a scale-free network as can be seen from the left panel of Figure 12 , where we plot the actual error score and the average error scores of the ER and scale-free networks (including plus and minus one standard error for the simulated models). Not surprisingly, the actual network is closer to a scale-free network even though the distance seems to increase with the GFC.
The right panel of Figure 12 shows the core sizes for the actual and random networks (again including one standard error for the simulated models).
45 In actual interbank networks, the observed scaling parameters vary between 2 and 3. Here we take the value found by De Masi et al. (2006) . 46 Interestingly, Craig and von Peter (2010) found that the error scores for the German interbank market are signicantly smaller than for SF networks. 47 Again we note that the results are almost identical to those from the tiering model. We see that the observed core is signicantly larger than both the core of the scale-free and ER networks. For the ER network, the core is spurious, while it would capture the most highly connected nodes in the scale-free network (although the core-periphery model would be a misspecication of the overall structure of such a network).
Overall, we nd that we can reject the hypothesis that our ndings are just artifacts of applying the core-periphery algorithms to random data, and we also nd that the popular scale-free model could not have generated our particular sets of identied cores and t of the model (error scores).
Continuous Model
We now move to the results from the continuous framework, mostly concentrating on the added explanatory power of the asymmetric version. We have seen in Table 1 and Figure 3 that the in-and out coreness vectors are mostly negatively correlated. Figure 13 shows a scatter-plot of the two variables, explicitly linking the ndings to the results of the discrete model. 
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In Figure 14 , we show the time-varying autocorrelations of the two coreness vectors. The autocorrelations were calculated as the correlation between two subsequent coreness vectors, using only banks that were active in both periods. We see that both the in-and out-coreness vectors are highly autocorrelated (average values: .8474 and .9186, respectively). We also calculated cross-correlations between the two vectors, where In-Out (Out-In) is the correlation between in-coreness in t − 1 (t) and out-coreness in t (t − 1). .4. 50 Obviously the t has to be better in the AC model, since we have twice as many parameters. Interestingly, the t is mostly more than twice as good as the t of the SC model. 
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This nding underscores the observed asymmetries in the network, which are absent from scale-free networks, where in-and out-degrees of individual 51 In this approach, we generated random ER and SF networks as explained above. Then, we randomly assigned observed transaction volumes from the actual networks (logtransformed) to the random ones. The results are essentially identical with and without replacement. Here we present the results without replacement. 52 Note that the PREs of the AC model are always larger than those from the SC model, both for the actual and the random networks (even though for the random networks not always signicantly). This is driven by the higher number of parameters (degrees of freedom) in the AC model. A Chow-test indicates that there is a structural break after quarter 39 at all sensible signicance levels for the PRE of the AC model. The results from an additional CUSUM-test are also in favor of the existence of a structural break. The PRE of the SC model appears to display an additional structural break after quarter 10. For the SF networks we used a scaling parameter of α = 2.3.
banks are highly correlated by construction.
In comparison with the closeness of the error scores of the empirical data and their scale-free resamples in Figure 12 , the consideration of the asymmetries of the concentration of incoming and outgoing links shows the limitations of the scale-free networks. While it appears reasonably similar to a symmetric core-periphery framework, it falls back behind the asymmetric continuous CP model at all levels of signicance. Since the t of the two-dimensional continuous approach (AC) is way better than that of the one-dimensional continuous approach (SC), we conclude that the directed version of the model contains important information about the structure of the interbank market.
What Denes a Core Bank?
In the following we will focus on the results from the discrete model.
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As a rst step, we calculate the correlations between the coreness vectors and dierent observable variables (degree, size, and trading activity).
54 It 53 Again the results for the tiering model are very similar and available upon request. 54 It would be interesting to analyze the interest rates charged in the dierent blocks in more detail. This is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Here we just note that the In−Degree Out−Degree Degree Figure 16 : Time-varying correlation between discrete coreness and indegree/out-degree/total degree. Total degree is the degree we would obtain from transforming the directed network into an undirected network.
would also be very interesting to forecast the coreness vectors based on nonnetwork-related observable variables, e.g. balance sheet size. Due to the anonymity of the data, such an analysis is, unfortunately, not possible. Figure 16 shows the correlation between the discrete coreness vectors and the in-, out-, and total degree (total degree is the degree from the undirected version of the network), respectively. The correlation is far higher for out-degree compared to in-degree, and the former has practically the same correlation with coreness as the total degree. Hence, it is the distribution of liquidity rather than its absorption, that identies the core banks in our sample.
We constructed similar measures for the individual sizes and the number of transactions per bank, see Figures 17 and 18 , respectively. We proxy the bank size by the transaction volumes in a particular quarter.
55 Here, in-size contains the total volume of borrowing transactions (per quarter and per bank), out-size the total volume of lending transactions and total size the (volume-weighted) average interest rate charged in the CC-block exceeds that of all other blocks (average value of 2.72% for the complete sample). Thus, it seems that core banks price in the systemic importance of other core banks, while giving more favorable prices to periphery banks (average value of 2.70%). Furthermore, the average interest rate charged between periphery banks tends to be quite small as well (average value of 2.71%). Thus, two periphery banks may grant each other more favorable prices as soon as they trade with each other on a regular basis. Note that, due to the non-stationarity of the interest rates, we checked the signicance by comparing the rst dierences. The total number of transactions is the sum of the two. We nd that the core banks are signicantly larger and more active than periphery banks (unreported). However, the size measure appears to be a less reliable indicator than the simple number of transactions, since it is far more volatile. Both measures, however, conrm again the dominant aspect of the out-direction (lending activity) for the core membership of a bank.
We also constructed the same gures for the continuous model, see Appendix A.5. As expected, the two coreness vectors can be better explained based on the directed version of the network. Most importantly, the correlation with the total degree is smaller compared to the correlation of in-coreness with in-degree and out-coreness with out-degree, respectively. Again, the correlations with the size measures are highly volatile.
We conclude that all measures point towards the lending activity as the more relevant aspect of core banks' participation in the market. The much lower relevance of their borrowing activity, then, explains why in-and outcoreness vectors in the asymmetric model are virtually uncorrelated.
What Happened During the GFC?
In this section, we provide a more detailed analysis of the eects of a major shock to the interbank network, namely the collapse of Lehman Brothers in quarter 39. So far, our analysis shows that the GFC indeed had a substantial impact on the network along many dimensions, in particular in terms of the goodness-of-t of the core-periphery models. To investigate the eects of the structural break in more detail, we split our sample into a short precrisis period (quarters 37 and 38) and a post-crisis period (40 and 41).
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Interestingly, despite the clear negative trend in the number of active banks during the complete sample period (cf. Figure 1) , the actual number during the analyzed subperiod is relatively stable with an average value of 98 banks.
Thus the network sizes during this particular period are comparable, which allows to compare dierent network-related measures. As a rst step, we will investigate network-related variables from a macro perspective. Then we take a closer look at the behavior of one particular exemplary core bank around the breakpoint.
As we have seen (cf. Figure 6 ), the GFC aected the block-structures of the discrete and the tiering model: Core banks trade signicantly less with each other (density in the CC-block smaller), and so do periphery banks (density in the PP-block smaller). In contrast, there is no evidence for a signicant structural break in the densities of the o-diagonal blocks. Core banks also tend to lend less money to the periphery (density in the CP-block smaller), while there is no clear trend in the amount that peripheral banks lend to the core, thus the periphery tends to maintain their links to the core during and after the crisis. Given that the GFC, and the resulting tensions in money markets, can be seen as the result of a crisis of condence, it comes as 56 Of course one could argue that the pre-GFC period should be further away from the breakpoint, however, here we are particularly interested in the network changes right at the phase transition. no surprise that core banks tend to reduce their risk exposure by cutting down the number of links going both to core and periphery banks.
57 Concerning the market activity, we nd that the total trading volumes (and also the total number of trades) in the CC-and the CP-blocks dropped substantially during the crisis, while it actually increased in the PP-block immediately after the GFC but then dropped substantially. In contrast, after a sharp drop of market activity in the PC-block right before the GFC, the total amount of credit owing from the periphery to the core actually increased after the GFC.
58 Thus it seems, that the crisis mainly aected the behavior of core banks, which rather hoarded their liquidity than providing it to a large number of other counterparties.
59 In contrast, periphery banks tend to keep (at times even expand) the number of outgoing links with core banks, while reducing the exposure to the periphery. The ndings on the Jaccard Index of the PC-block (cf. Figure 10) , however, indicate that periphery banks do not necessarily lend money to the same core banks over time. Overall, from the relatively stable Jaccard indices it appears that no major disruption of the network pattern occurred (cf. section 5.2.2), but that the aggregate volume of lending by core banks has declined substantially. Hence, most of the network structure remained intact, but continued its operations at a much lower level of activity. This nding speaks in factor of a positive eect of relationship lending that helped to prevent a complete collapse of the interbank market after the onset of the nancial crisis (as suggested by Anito (2011), and Braeuning (2011) ).
To illustrate the generally observed tendencies, we picked the (core) bank with the highest aggregate trading volume.
60 During this period, the particular bank had an average in-degree of 30, while its average out-degree was substantially higher with 64.
61 These mean values, however, hide the dynamic development, since there was a sharp drop in the banks' out-degree during the GFC (the maximum level pre-GFC was 80, the minimum level at the end of the period is merely 32), while the in-degree actually increased during the crisis (the minimum level pre-GFC was 15, the maximum level at 57 Interestingly, the number of reciprocal links, i.e. the fraction of links pointing in both directions, goes down due to the GFC. This is somewhat surprising, since we would expect that bilateral relationship become closer in crisis times. 58 The increase in the number of trades in the PC-block after the GFC is even more impressive, ending up above the pre-GFC level.
59 Interestingly, core banks lend more money than they borrow from the periphery, thus the core is a net lender to the periphery. 60 In fact, this bank (ID number`IT0278') was in the core during the complete sample period.
61 These numbers just underline the observed asymmetry between the CP-and PCblocks. 62 Interestingly, while the bank was a net-lender during most of the sample period, we see that the bank actually reversed its strategy during the GFC, since it became a net-borrower afterwards (see Figure 20) . Thus, the bank tried to attract liquidity, mainly from periphery banks, since core banks became reluctant to trade with other core banks.
Summing up, we conclude that the GFC both aected the behavior of core and periphery banks: Periphery banks seem to have increased their lending to the core, both in terms of the number of links and trading volumes.
In contrast, core banks have reduced their lending, not only to other core banks, but also to the periphery. The decline in goodness-of-t of the coreperiphery structure is therefore mostly due to a loosening of the core. Core banks activated a smaller number of their previous outgoing links. Hence they started to hoard liquidity rather than distributing it in the system. Therefore, it seems that core banks tend to rely on the liquidity of periphery banks during times of distress, while in`normal' times they would more freely redistribute liquidity in the complete system. 62 It would be interesting to see the quote data, rather than the transaction data. We suspect, that many quotes are simply never executed during the GFC. 
Discussion
The majority of studies on the structure of interbank networks has hitherto concentrated on the distribution of degrees. Many authors mention the nding of some form of community structure in the interbank market, suggesting a tightly connected core of money-center banks.
63 The nding of a core-periphery structure in the Italian interbank market can be seen as a special case of community structure, 64 where the core is a tightly connected part of the network, and the periphery is the loosely connected component.
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Even though we only know of only one other study in this regard, it may well be that the nding of a core-periphery structure could be seen as a neẁ stylized fact' of modern banking systems. As far as data are available, it would be important to test this hypothesis in other interbank networks.
An important question is of course why we nd a core-periphery structure in the interbank market. In the literature on social network analysis, two main explanations for the emergence of a core-periphery structure exist: (1) 63 See Iori et al. (2006) and Soramäki et al. (2006) . 64 Note that communities are usually dened as very dense subgraphs, with few connections between them. The periphery is thus more of an anti-community. 65 We also checked several standard community detecting algorithms for the Italian interbank network. The main nding is that, for the entire market, we nd two separate communities consisting of foreign and Italian banks, respectively. Interestingly, it is impossible to split these communities further into smaller subcommunities. Thus it seems even more remarkable that we nd a core-periphery structure in this market.
`Superior' core members possess an intrinsic advantage over the`inferior' periphery members, such that the core exerts power over the periphery.
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In order for a core-periphery structure to emerge, the advantage of the core members must be reected in attributes aecting the linking behavior of all agents.
67 Then core agents would be able to translate their advantage into a positional advantage in the social network.
68 Transferring this idea to banking networks, one encounters several problems. First, it is not clear a priori which attributes might make core banks`superior' to the periphery.
We would also need to come up with an explanation why core banks share attributes that periphery banks do not have. Note also that this denition implies that it should be preferable for all banks to be part of the core, which is not very plausible. For example, a small bank (in terms of its balance sheet) would nd it hard to intermediate between other core banks, simply because it does not command a sucient amount of funds to do so. Therefore, this bank will always prefer being in the`inferior' periphery, where it still might intermediate between other small banks. Furthermore, the general nding of disassortative mixing patterns in banking networks 69 is not in line with the power-based explanation, since core banks would then be reluctant to create links with periphery agents. Nevertheless, if we dene power as the ability of inuencing the market, it may well be that it is an important driver for the emergence of a core-periphery structure in the banking network. 67 For example, in a scientic network, the core agents are the highly productive agents being cited by many others. See Mullins et al. (1977) . 68 Persitz (2009) provides a formal model for a power-based core-periphery network. The basic idea is that linking preferences are such that all agents prefer establishing links tò superior' agents relative to`inferior' agents.
69 See Finger et al. (2012) . 70 For banks, the comparative advantage may stem from economies of scope and scale, but also from very frequent interactions on the market which small periphery banks usually do not have. 71 Note that, despite the overall disassortative mixing patterns, the core-periphery structure indicates that we should actually dierentiate between these patterns in the core and the periphery: the periphery mostly shows disassortative mixing within itself, while the sortative mixing patterns, but also with the evidence in Cocco et al. (2009): small banks, with limited access to international capital markets and possibly limited investment/nancing opportunities due to their more locally oriented business model, tend to rely on preferential relationships with (large) core banks. Thus, core banks act as intermediaries between dierent parts of the periphery of the domestic banking system, resulting in indirect relationships between peripheral banks. Note that this explanation is also in line with the observed asymmetry between the densities in the CP-and the PC-blocks, since they imply that periphery banks cut down their credit risk by focusing on a few selected core banks, while they are prepared to borrow money from a larger set of core banks.
Finally, we would like to focus on the potential implications of our ndings for regulators. It is well known that the structure of a network is important for its resilience, hence policymakers should be interested in the actual topology of the interbank network. For stress-testing exercises, it would, therefore, be crucial to use a topological description of the connections within the banking sector that is both realistic and computationally tractable. Most stress-testing scenarios have actually adapted an entropy-maximization approach for lling the unknown matrices of interbank liabilities.
72 This means, that given some overall statistics for the whole system, interbank credit is spread as evenly as possible across the system 73 An idealized core-periphery structure amounts to pretty much the opposite in terms of concentration of interbank liabilities. If the data were closer to the latter type of structure, the entropy-based approach could give misleading results for the expected aftereects to shocks aecting single institutions. If, as we believe, the coreperiphery structure turns out to be a stylized fact of the interbank market, stress-tests should take this particular topology into account. Unknown amounts of interbank liabilities could then be calibrated along the structural features of typical core-periphery models for available data (like those of the present paper and Craig and von Peter, 2011). As our results show, it might also be important to take into account asymmetries in the borrowing and lending attitudes of core banks. Even when comparing the eects of shocks between dierent network models with some tendency of concentration of links, important dierences might exist. For example, networks with scale-free degree distributions are known to be robust with respect to random failures, but fragile with respect to targeted attacks on the most central core shows more of assortative mixing among its members, since core banks tend to connect among themselves.
72 See Sheldon and Maurer (1998) , and Upper and Worms (2004) . 73 Note that this is equivalent to the benchmark against which the error reduction by the continuous core-periphery model is measured.
nodes.
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The usual mechanism to construct scale-free degree distributions is that of preferential attachment, see Barabasi and Albert (1999) , so highdegree nodes tend to attract more links than low-degree nodes over time. As described above, we did not nd evidence for scale-free degree distributions in the e-MID data and also nd disassortative rather than assortative mixing patterns. Comparing assortative to disassortative networks, Newman (2002) shows that, for the same degree distribution, assortative ones are more robust to targeted attacks compared to disassortative ones. Since an assortative network possesses a whole set of nodes with large in-and out-degrees, i.e. many connections across the entire network, the system is characterized by a certain degree of redundancy that makes it more robust under attacks on single highly connected nodes. In contrast, the disassortative network is more susceptible to removal of high-degree nodes, which are not as tightly connected as in the assortative case. Thus, removing high-degree nodes allows to attack dierent parts of the network.
In a somewhat related strand of research, Brede and de Vries (2009) show that core-periphery structures might emerge from an evolutionary process as a compromise between resilience (concentration makes the network more vulnerable) and eciency of a network (concentration creates short average path lengths).
75 From an economic point of view, the question would be whether the self-organization of the interbank network into a core-periphery structure creates important externalities so that policymakers should attempt to shift the balance towards higher resilience and somewhat lower eciency.
Of course, regulators should also be interested in the dynamics of a network, when the breakdown of one node has knock-on eects on other nodes. Their main nding is that the likelihood of contagion, i.e. the breakdown of the entire system, is smaller for disassortative networks. Since in the latter, high-degree nodes tend to connect with low-degree nodes, the failure of a random node is unlikely to spread through the entire system. Conversely, the random breakdown of a high-degree node will severely aect other highdegree nodes in assortative networks. Note that this is dierent from the aspect of vulnerability under targeted attacks. As a consequence, a disassortative core-periphery framework might be more robust in`normal' times, but more fragile under exceptional circumstances when key nodes are under 74 See Albert et al. (2000) . 75 Note that the highest eciency is realized in star-like congurations, while the highest resilience is related to the avoidance of short loops and degree homogeneity. See also Netotea and Pongor (2006) . stress or withdraw from the market. Hence, the`coreness' translates to a certain extent into`systemic relevance' of certain institutions.
76 The GFC seems to have been a major shock to the interbank network, as tests for structural breaks indicate. The observation that the t of the core-periphery models signicantly worsened with the GFC, might provide important information per se on the endogenous reaction of the system to stress which could be incorporated in stress-test scenarios. Furthermore the goodness-of-t of the core-periphery framework might be seen as an indicator of tensions in the interbank market, so that various statistics based upon such a framework could be used as early warning signals of impending crises.
Conclusions
The main ndings of our paper are the following: we nd a signicant core-periphery structure in the Italian interbank network for a sample period from January 1999 to December 2010. The identied core is quite persistent over time, consisting of roughly 28% of sample banks before the GFC and 23% afterwards (discrete model). Given the substantial dierences in the German and Italian interbank market data investigated by Craig and von Peter (2010) and the present paper, e.g. in the underlying region and the maturity structure of the credit relationships, the nding of a core-periphery structure is unlikely to be a coincidence. We expect that other interbank markets display a similar hierarchical structure, which might be classied as a new`stylized fact' of modern interbank networks and actually concretizes on a system level the role of money center banks. Going beyond the analysis of Craig and von Peter (2010) , we also investigate the continuous and asymmetric versions of core-periphery models and nd evidence for strong asymmetries. In particular, overall coreness is mainly driven by the function of provision of liquidity to large parts of the banking system by the core members. Overall coreness is, therefore, largely identical to out-coreness, while its connection to in-coreness is very weak. Regulators should be aware of the fact that a bank which is part of the in-core but not of the out-core, may play a completely dierent role in the system than a bank with the reverse strategy.
Formal tests favor the existence of a structural break in the last quarter of 2008, the time when Lehman Brothers collapsed. We investigated this time period in more detail and found that the deteriorating t of the coreperiphery structure in the post-GFC period is mainly due to the loosening of connections in the core, particularly on the lending side. Furthermore, 76 See also Markose et al. (2010) . it seems that during times of distress, core banks tend to rely on periphery banks as an important source of funding, since other core banks are reluctant to provide as much liquidity to other banks as in normal times.
Our ndings provide some support for the view that the network structure is non-random due to the existence of preferential lending relationships. This is in line with the results of Cocco et al. (2009 ), Anito (2011 ), and Braeuning (2011 . Further evidence in this regard is provided by Finger and Lux (2011) , who analyze the evolution of the banking network using the actor-oriented approach by Snijders (1996 Snijders ( , 2001 . The general conclusion is that preferential lending relationships at the micro-level lead to hierarchal structure at the macro-level. An open question is why the interbank network shows such a hierarchy. We argue that the comparative advantage of core banks in gathering and distributing information about their counterparties is likely to be a crucial factor.
In the future we plan to apply the model to other interbank data, in order to evaluate whether the core-periphery structure is indeed a new stylized fact of banking systems. Furthermore, it would be interesting to relate the results to bank-specic variables, such as individual balance-sheet data. In any case, this approach can be seen as a contribution to identifying the systemically important banks in a quantitative way. We also believe that the methods presented here could be an important tool for regulators since they allow to reduce the complexity of large-scale network data, and to represent the salient structural features of the complicated web of dispersed activity in the interbank market in a compact way.
